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In the fall of 2003, the International 
Monetary Funds published the results 
of its latest Financial Sector Assessment 
Study, focusing this time on Germany. 
This report contained some important 
conclusions  concerning  the  future 
of  Germany’s  three-pillars  banking 
system. 
The public debate that ensued after the 
report’s  release  in  November  quickly 
made it clear that our knowledge con-
cerning the basic performance charac-
teristics of Germany’s banking system 
was  actually  quite  limited  –  and  has 
remained  so  to  date.  For  example, 
there  is  little  factual  information,  let 
alone comparative analysis, on product 
market  competition,  pricing,  service 
level  characteristics,  or  on  corporate 
governance  with  respect  to  specific 
market segments or regions. 
This lack of hard data is all the more 
disturbing  as,  from  an  international 
perspective, Germany’s banking system 
is seen as the prototype of a bank-based 
system, and is frequently referred to in 
many discussions among academics and 
policymakers  on  comparative  issues. 
The apparent financial system stability 
in terms of institutional structure makes 
an  understanding  of  its  prerequisites 
particularly relevant. 
The report by the IMF was written while 
some of us were involved in editing a 
handbook  on  the  German  financial 
system  (which  has  since  been  pub-
lished with Oxford University Press). 
Its international reception made clear 
that there is a strong interest in how the 
German financial system is evolving. 
Having discussed these issues with the 
IMF team visiting Frankfurt in 2003, 
we expanded on this theme of common 
interest  and  decided  to  hold  a  joint   
conference  in  early  2005.  The  idea 
was  to  bring  together  representatives 
of  Germany’s  three  banking  pillars, 
policymakers, and academics in order 
to discuss the following issues: 
•   What are the responses to the conclu-
sions and suggestions contained in the 
original IMF report? 
•   What has changed since the authors 
of the report collected their informa-
tion in 2003? 
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the  National  and  International  Fiscal 
and Monetary Policy Department at the 
German  Ministry  of  Finance,  Stefan 
Ingves, Director of the Monetary and 
Financial  Systems  Department  at  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  Hans-
Helmut Kotz, Member of the Execu-
tive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
and  Karlheinz Weimar,  Minister  of 
Finance for the State of Hesse. 
Overall,  the  conference  made  clear 
that a definite assessment of the welfare 
implications of the three-pillars system 
is less evident than most observers from 
within Germany seem to believe. We 
take  this  lesson  to  imply  a  need  for 
additional research focused on perfor-
mance, competition and governance of 
Germany’s financial system. 
This is also the starting signal for a fresh 
attempt to find answers to the many 
questions that remained open during the 
conference, using the research network 
established  under  the  auspices  of  the 
CFS program “Financial Intermediation 
and Risk Management”. 
To conclude, we would like to thank 
all speakers and guests for their active 
participation  in  the  forum;  and  the 
IMF  and  CFS  for  their  financial  and   
logistical  support  that  allowed  the 
conference  to  be  so  successful.  Our 
thanks also go to Isabelle Panther, 
who provided the administrative sup-
port and is responsible for the smooth 
running and enjoyable atmosphere that 
prevailed throughout the event. 
On the following pages you will find 
excerpts from all the contributions to 
the  conference  –  they  deserve  your 
attention because they not only show 
where we stand, but they also have a lot 
to say about where we are expecting to 
go in the near future. We hope that you 
will enjoy reading these excerpts – and 
we shall look forward to seeing you at 
the next conference on the role of public 
and  private  ownership  of  financial 
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•   And what do outside observers, i.e., 
government officials, investment bank-
ers, or academics have to say on the 
performance and stability of this bank-
based financial system? 
The conference was held on March 7, 
2005  in  Frankfurt/Main.  The  open-
ing  session  comprised  two  thought-
provoking  talks,  one  by  Franklin 
Allen, the leading international scholar 
on financial system analysis and a long-
time  proponent  of  the  strengths  of 
bank-based financial architecture. The 
other  talk  was  delivered  by  Mario 
Monti,  formerly  the  Commissioner 
at the European Union responsible for 
the competitive structure of European 
markets,  including  financial  markets, 
and  now  the  President  of  Italy’s 
prestigious Bocconi University.
A  special  session  was  devoted  to  the 
key findings of the IMF’s Financial Sector 
Assessment  Program  study  on  Germany. 
The  results  and  conclusions  were 
presented by two of its authors, Jörg 
Decression and Daniel Hardy, both 
from the IMF. 
The morning session continued with what 
some observers labeled the “key panel”, 
an  encounter  between  high-ranking 
spokesmen of the three banking pillars in 
Germany. It consisted of Christopher 
Pleister, President of the Association 
of  German  Cooperative  Banks,  Karl-
Peter Schackmann-Fallis, Executive 
Member of the Board of the Association 
of German Savings Banks, and Manfred 
Weber, Chief Executive Officer of the 
Association of German Banks. 
The afternoon session saw two further 
panels that grouped industry and policy-
maker responses. First, in a panel entitled 
“Reorganization  and  Consolidation  of 
Public  Sector  Banks”  three  prominent 
bankers  discussed  their  experiences 
with public sector banking, from both 
an internal and external perspective. The 
panelists were Norbert Bräuer, Mem-
ber of the Board of Managing Directors 
of  the  Landesbank  Hesse-Thuringia, 
Lutz Raettig, Chairman of the Supervi-
sory Board of Morgan Stanley Bank, and 
Andrea Moneta, Head of New Europe 
Division at UniCredito Italiano. 
The concluding panel brought together 
leading policymakers, all with a public 
finance background. Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, Member of the Executive 
Board  of  the  European  Central  Bank, 
opened the session with an introductory 
speech  on  Germany  and  European 
financial integration. The panel further 
consisted of Jörg Asmussen, Head of 
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As a result, it is not clear exactly how 
to  interpret  this  finding  concerning 
Germany’s banks. A second issue with 
regard to the cross-country compari-
sons of asset returns is that the risk of 
banking assets may vary across countries 
and  this  will  lead  to  differences  in 
expected  returns.  No  adjustment  for 
risk is made in the study. Including such 
an adjustment may lead to a quite dif-
ferent  picture.  Once  it  is  recognized 
that asset returns are risky, focusing on 
figures for only a few years may also be 
misleading.
The  report  makes  adjustments  for 
countries being at different stages of the 
business cycle by using macro variables 
such as the output gap and interest rates. 
Allen suggested that another important 
variable  that  could  perhaps  be  used 
is  the  state  of  the  real  estate  market 
since it is so important for the health of 
banking industry. In recent years real 
estate returns have been much worse 
in  Germany  than  in  other  countries. 
For example, BIS data shows that if real 
house prices at the start of 1995 are 
normalized to 100%, then by the end 
of 2001 German house values had fallen 
to 91% of their initial value. In contrast, 
in Italy they were 104%, France 128%, 
Spain 151%, and the UK 178%. 
As last empirical issue, Allen stressed 
that there is no analysis in the report 
of the effects of public ownership on 
financial stability. Unlike many other 
countries Germany has been exception-
ally stable. Upper and Worms’ (2002)1 
study on bilateral exposure and risk of 
contagion in Germany suggests that this 
stability is likely to continue. 
Turning next to theoretical issues, Allen 
argued that the IMF report correctly 
emphasizes the importance of identify-
ing the market failures in Germany that 
would  provide  a  rationale  for  public 
ownership of half the banking system. 
One possibility is that public banks can 
undertake projects with higher public 
than  private  rates  of  return  but  the 
report argues that this task is already 
performed by the development banks. 
A second possible market failure is that 
banking has increasing returns to scale 
but increasing returns run out well below 
the scale that is relevant for German 
banks. A third is that public banks may 
be the only way to ensure broad access 
to financial services but the Postbank 
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Allen started his speech describing the 
advantages  of  Germany’s  three-pillar 
banking system. He argued this system 
has been very successful in many ways. 
It has done a good job allocating funds to 
industry. Until reunification the German 
economy was one of the best performing 
in the world and many attributed this 
to its banking system. Finally, Germany 
has not had a widespread banking crisis 
in the post-war period. 
He then summarized the major points of 
the IMF Report on the German banking 
system. The report starts by comparing 
the performance of German banks with 
the performance of banks in other coun-
tries. German banks turn out to be less 
profitable than banks elsewhere because 
of low revenues rather than cost inef-
ficiencies. The report suggests that the 
ending of public sector guarantees will 
put further pressure on the profitability 
of public sector banks. Furthermore, it 
suggests that efficiency does not differ 
markedly  between  public  and  private 
sector  banks,  but  also  that  market 
failures  are  not  sufficient  to  justify 
public ownership of half of the bank-
ing system and that public sector banks 
should be restructured. Privatizations of 
public sector banking systems in Aus-
tria, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden 
provide examples of the benefits that 
can be obtained from doing this.
In Allen’s view the report is a careful piece 
of work and a good starting point for the 
debate about how the German banking 
system  should  be  reformed.  However, 
he stressed the report is only a start and 
much more research is needed. Given 
the success of the current system it is not 
immediately clear that a radical reform is 
needed. Allen commented then in detail 
on the report dividing his comments into 
empirical and theoretical issues.
The first empirical issue he discussed 
concerns the report’s finding that prof-
itability as measured by return on assets 
has trended downward in the last five 
years and is less than in other countries. 
Accounting  data  across  countries  is 
difficult to compare because of differ-
ences in regulatory features of national 
banking systems, accounting rules and 
practices,  and  reporting  methods.   
1   C. Upper and A. Worms (2002). “Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank Market:  
Is there a Danger of Contagion?” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 09/02.
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A second market failure identified by 
Allen results from incomplete contract-
ing possibilities that make it very costly 
for  the  private  sector  to  create  AAA 
assets and AAA counterparty risk. Gov-
ernments can provide AAA guarantees 
at low cost because they can tax, which 
the private sector cannot.
The possibility of contagion and financial 
fragility represent a third market failure. 
Contagion through the interbank market 
(Allen and Gale 2000) and through asset 
prices (Allen and Gale 2004) potentially 
poses a serious threat to financial sta-
bility.  Publicly  guaranteed  assets  and 
positions as counterparties by publicly 
owned banks can act as “firewalls” and 
prevent contagion. Thus financial sta-
bility provides a good justification for 
public ownership of banks.
Starting from the discussion of market 
failures, Allen suggested a number of 
research issues. How important quan-
titatively  is  intertemporal  smoothing? 
What is the public cost to local and state 
governments of providing guarantees? 
How does this compare with the private 
sector’s cost of providing guarantees?   
If the public sector’s cost of guarantees 
is less than the private sector’s cost, then 
the Sparkassen and Landesbanken may 
be  efficient  institutions  that  generate 
revenue through these cost savings. As 
an empirical matter, if one takes account 
of the activities funded by these institu-
tions, their increase in value, and any 
rebates to the governments are the Spar-
kassen and Landesbanken subsidized or 
net contributors to local and state bud-
gets?  What  are  the  financial  stability 
effects of abolishing state guarantees of 
securities issued in the interbank market 
and counterparty risk in terms of conta-
gion and financial fragility?
In his conclusion, Allen stressed again 
that more research is needed to defini-
tively establish the desirability of chang-
ing the German banking sector. Finan-
cial stability and efficiency potentially 
provide  strong  arguments  for  public 
ownership. Finally, rather than elimi-
nate public ownership a better way to 
restructure the German banking system 
might be to allow Citigroup or HSBC to 
acquire Deutsche Bank. 
 
and privatized Sparkassen can achieve 
this objective. A final justification for 
public banks is that they can operate 
with  a  long-run  perspective  and  so 
can overcome asymmetric information 
through relationships better. However, 
the report argues that cooperative banks 
can do this. 
After commenting on the report, Allen 
argued  that  there  are  other  market 
failures that provide a justification for 
public  ownership.  One  is  incomplete 
intertemporal risk sharing opportunities. 
German households hold much more in 
bank accounts and much less in equity 
than US households. As a result Ger-
man households bear significantly less 
financial risk than their US counterparts 
despite  the  US  having  a  much  more 
developed set of financial markets. How 
can this paradox be explained? Citing 
previous work coauthored with Gale2, 
he argued that when risk sharing oppor-
tunities  are  incomplete  public  sector 
banks  that  do  not  maximize  profits 
allow better intertemporal smoothing 
than financial markets. 
2   F. Allen and D. Gale (1997). “Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing,”  
Journal of Political Economy 105, 523-546.
3 F. Allen and D. Gale (2000). “Financial Contagion,” Journal of Political Economy 108, 1-33.
4   F. Allen and D. Gale (2004). “Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices,” Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 2, 1015-1048.
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state guarantees to German public banks 
and the European rules on state aid. As 
the guarantees were without limitations 
as regards time and amount and without 
compensation, they were considered by 
the Commission to be a hidden form of 
state-aid and were therefore critically 
addressed  in  the  communication  of 
1999. This communication included a 
number of inferences about how either 
to eliminate these guarantees or to make 
them  compatible  with  the  European 
competition rules.
The  earlier  debates  and  the  commu-
nication’s requirements triggered sub-
stantial resistance on the German side. 
Under  pressure  from  the  ‘Länder’, 
the  federal  government,  first  under 
Chancellor Kohl and then later under 
Chancellor  Schröder,  had  threatened 
to block the ratification of certain trea-
ties (Amsterdam and Nice) should the 
Commission continue to force Germany 
to apply European competition rules to 
its  public  banks.  Two  aspects  of  this 
resistance, both legal and political, are 
of particular interest.
Firstly, the German side was invoking 
the article of the treaty about neutrality 
with  respect  to  public  and  private 
ownership  in  order  to  justify  the 
principle of ‘Anstaltslast’ (the so-called 
maintenance obligation which refers to 
the liability assumed by a public sector 
body for the debts of an enterprise incor-
porated under public law). The position 
of the Commission was that member 
states are indeed free to choose the legal 
form of undertakings and to decide in 
favor of public or private ownership, but 
they must nevertheless respect the rules 
relating to competition.
Secondly, strong and rather aggressively 
voiced political resistance was expressed 
in the accusation that the Commission 
wanted to destroy the German three-
pillar  system  and  public  ownership, 
with the ultimate objective of enforc-
ing  the  privatization  of  Landesbanks, 
Sparkassen and Special Banks.
Monti gave both economic and politi-
cal reasons for this strong line of resis-
tance. It is well known that the state 
guarantees enable the Landesbanks to 
secure advantages in refinancing costs 
and to expand aggressively internation-
ally, but this provides little insight into 
explaining why this system is so strongly 
supported.  In  this  respect  Monti 
identified a rather close and privileged 
relationship between the political world, 
especially at the regional (Länder) level, 
and the public banks.
Monti started his speech with a remark 
about the German attitude to the issue 
of competition policy. While on the one 
hand Germany is the European country 
from  which  competition  culture  first 
originated before spreading across other 
European countries, on the other hand 
it is also Germany that has shown the 
strongest resistance to the fully-fledged 
consequences  and  implications  of  the 
competition policy it created. 
Turning  to  the  intervention  of  the 
European  Commission  on  the  issue 
of  German  banking,  Monti  stressed 
that  beyond  the  macroeconomic  and 
political  implications  of  the  phasing 
out  of  state  guarantees,  the  political 
economy  approach  –  specifically  the 
mixture  of  economic,  political,  legal 
and psychological intricacies concern-
ing this time-honored piece of German 
structures  and  societies  –  seems  of 
particular  interest  with  regard  to 
obtaining a more comprehensive under-
standing of the issue. Already the first 
dialogue between the Commission and 
Germany’s authorities in 1996 resulted 
in a deep concern on the part of the 
German authorities about the possible 
impact  European  Competition  Policy 
might  have  on  the  German  banking 
system. In fact in June 1997 the German 
authorities  insisted  that  guarantees 
to  the  German  public  banks  should 
remain outside the scope of application 
of European competition rules on state-
aid control.
Hence the dialogue between the Euro-
pean  Commission  and  Germany’s 
authorities was marked by strong tension 
from its very beginning in 1996. The 
Commission was particularly concerned 
about  the  inconsistency  between  the 
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importance.  The  dialogue  about  how 
to deal with state guarantees brought 
about a series of positive “externalities”,   
both  substantive  and  political,  for 
competition policy. The German exam-
ple has become a sort of a blueprint for 
other  intervention  cases  with  regard 
to European competition policy, such 
as the Austrian banking industry, the 
financial services in Italy, and Electric-
ité de France in France. Furthermore, 
regarding  “political  externalities”, 
the German case was an unequivocal 
response  to  criticisms  concerning 
unequal  treatment  among  member 
states, since it made clear that the same 
competition  policy  applies  to  all  EU 
member states irrespective of their size. 
In fact, it was a clear example that the 
Commission  is  prepared  to  intervene 
with respect to the large EU member 
states in order to enforce the rules of 
the Treaty.
Monti underlined that the Commission 
certainly did not try to eliminate public 
ownership, but had the duty to eliminate 
distortions to competition. To achieve 
this,  it  set  out  an  approach  that  was 
open to negotiations but was combined 
with the threat of legal enforcement, 
in order to make sure that the nego-
tiations would be ultimately productive 
and bring about a satisfactory solution. 
In this context the Commission did, of 
course, respect the rights of the member 
states to choose the legal form of under-
takings and to decide whether to have 
private or public ownership, but it did 
make clear that if the legal form gives 
companies  advantages  that  produce 
distortions in competition, which are 
prohibited by the state-aid rules, then 
this legal form must be subjected to the 
discipline of these rules. Looking back 
it was a very difficult problem to tackle, 
which required extensive and multilevel 
negotiations. At different stages, nego-
tiations  involved  the  Federal  govern-
ment (Minister of Finance Hans Eichel 
and  particularly  State  Secretary  Caio 
Koch-Weser,  but  in  certain  moments 
also  Chancellor  Gerhard  Schröder 
himself), the governments of the Län-
der, the Association of the Public Banks. 
The final agreement between Germany 
and the Commission was reached in July 
2001.
Monti  underlined  the  importance  of 
the  bilateral  understanding  that  was 
eventually reached. Without a consen-
sual solution Germany would have gone 
to the European Court of Justice, with 
the hope of getting the Court to pro-
nounce  against  the  Commission,  and 
that  would  have  created  great  uncer-
tainty about the nature and timing of the 
final outcome. He highlighted the inter-
esting fact that Germany rejected the 
offer made by the Commission to allow 
the saving banks, with the exception of 
very few, very large savings banks, to 
continue  to  operate  with  guarantees. 
By  comparison  to  the  Landesbanks, 
the Sparkassen do not have significant 
impact on cross-border trade both in 
terms of lending, which is largely local, 
and in terms of funding, which depends 
on a predominantly local deposit base 
without  much  access  to  international 
capital markets. However, the German 
side decided not to accept the offer made 
because keeping the public banking sec-
tor unified took priority over economic 
advantages. Monti interpreted this as a 
clear indication of the importance that 
political considerations had during the 
entire process.
Monti finished his speech by summa-
rizing  the  broader  implications  from 
the German case, which are of great Presentation of the IMF Report
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Germany, the ratio was about 0.6 percent 
for both 2002 and 2003. The situation in 
Germany  had  deteriorated  to  a  point 
where it had prompted discussion about 
a credit crunch, although the existence or 
intensity of such a crunch could be debat-
ed. Over the longer term, capital would 
leave the German banking system unless 
it was better rewarded. It was therefore 
imprudent to proceed on the assumption 
that all was well with the system.
According to Decressin and Hardy, the 
profit weaknesses in Germany was large-
ly structural rather than cyclical and the 
structural weakness did not reflect high-
er competition among banks. For exam-
ple, purging indicators of profitability 
of cyclical effects (proxied by the out-
put gap and interest rate) revealed that 
German banks’ profitability was at only 
about one third of the level of that in 
the other countries reviewed. Regard-
ing competition, savings banks did not 
really compete with one another and 
the  same  was  true  among  coopera-
tive banks, as they operated along the 
“regional”  principle.  Thus,  the  large 
number of banks in Germany could not 
be taken to point to strong competition. 
Decressin and Hardy therefore explored 
the relation between revenues and costs 
to gauge competition, using the Panzar-
Rosse (1987) H-statistic. Overall, this 
Decressin and Hardy presented their 
paper “Germany’s Three Pillar Banking 
System: Cross Country Perspectives in 
Europe”  (IMF  Occasional  Paper  233). 
This paper had been prepared as part of 
the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment 
Program with Germany, undertaken in 
2003.  In  their  presentation  Decressin 
and Hardy compared the performance 
of banks in Germany with that in other 
countries (France, Italy, Spain, United 
Kingdom); explained the repercussions 
of the phase out of government guar-
antees for public sector banks and the 
required  restructuring;  discussed  the 
rationale for public sector involvement 
in banking in Germany; and presented 
experiences with public sector banks in 
other countries.
Decressin and Hardy observed that the 
structure of the German banking system 
was unusual in various respects when 
compared with the systems in the other 
EU countries reviewed. First, it includ-
ed a large number of banks – over 2000 
– or about twice the number of banks 
in France and more than eight times the 
number in Spain. Second, the share of 
public sector banks in total banking sys-
tem assets was very high, reaching about 
45  percent. That  said,  aside  from  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  other  countries 
reviewed also had several banking system 
pillars, including private banks, public 
sector banks, and cooperative banks, just 
as Germany did. But none came close to 
Germany with respect to the size of the 
public sector. Nor had the structure in 
the other countries been as stable as in 
Germany; they had generally witnessed 
major and fairly recent shifts in the com-
position of the various pillars.
One important issue was the decline in 
the profitability of the German banking 
system, which had fallen to disconcert-
ingly low levels, according to Decressin 
and Hardy. The return on assets (ROA) 
before  tax  in  the  banking  system  was 
essentially zero in 2003, down from 0.15 
percent in 2002. For the EU excluding 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)  
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How  should  the  restructuring  in  the 
German  banking  system  proceed? 
Decressin and Hardy argued that there 
was no single business model or blue-
print  for  restructuring.  Restructur-
ing had to be guided by market forces 
to successfully improve banks’ opera-
tions. This required the removal of var-
ious barriers to restructuring, notably 
the “public law” ownership structure of 
public sector banks. Specifically, trans-
forming public sector banks into joint 
stock corporations would enhance their 
ability to attract new capital, including 
in periods of stress; merge or expand 
both within and across pillars, which 
under the “public law” form involved a 
laborious political process; and harness 
market signals (beyond ratings, which 
had all too often had played catch-up 
with markets) to guide the restructur-
ing  efforts,  by  placing  some  stock  in 
markets. 
Furthermore,  the  restructuring  had 
to  be  supported  with  reforms  to  the 
relation did not differ much in Germany 
from  that  in  the  other  EU  countries 
reviewed, suggesting a broadly similar 
degree of competition, notwithstanding 
lower profitability and a larger number 
of institutions.
Decressin and Hardy presented estimates 
of revenue and cost functions suggesting 
that the German banks’ profit weakness 
was rooted mainly in low revenue rath-
er than high cost. Specifically, German 
banks had lagged in the development of 
nontraditional revenues, doing little to 
offset  the  erosion  of  interest  revenue 
driven by rising competition from new 
intermediaries. Evidence from revenue 
functions – using microeconomic data 
on thousands of EU banks – suggested 
that  German  banks  generated  some   
10-15 percent less revenue than other EU 
banks, holding constant for differences 
in scale, factor inputs, and asset struc-
ture. Since these estimates also consid-
ered differences in the degree of capi-
talization across banks, they indirectly 
(although imperfectly) adjusted for asset 
risk. The reason was that banks with 
riskier balance sheets were required to 
hold more capital to meet EU capital 
adequacy standards. 
Decressin and Hardy argued that the 
structural strains on profitability could 
be expected to increase, requiring signif-
icant restructuring in the German bank-
ing system, some of which was underway 
already. Specifically, the public guaran-
tees for Landesbanken and savings banks 
would be phased out in mid-2005. The 
Landesbanken would lose their AAA rat-
ing, with downgradings to around the 
single A range, with a few BBB. These 
downgradings would gradually raise the 
average  cost  of  funding,  significantly 
cutting Landesbanken profitability over 
time. While the situation of individual 
Landesbanken  differed,  restructurings 
would be needed to maintain the initial 
ratings. Decressin and Hardy presented 
estimates according to which Landes-
banken would have to increase income 
by 20-40 percent to maintain their new 
ratings over the long run or risk further 
downgradings. Alternatively, estimates, 
for the cost side suggested that personnel 
expenses would need to be cut by 30-80 
percent. These estimates were not fore-
casts, but rather illustrated the size of the 
needed adjustment. Work to adjust was 
underway and encompassed all players 
in the public sector: the Landesbanken, 
who were directly concerned; Sparkas-
sen because they stood behind the Lan-
desbanken either as owners or through 
the institutional guarantee scheme; and 
the  regional  governments  as  ultimate 
owners of the public sector banks. 
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countries.  They  observed  that  many 
other  countries,  including  Austria, 
France,  Italy,  and  Spain,  had  larg-
er  public  sector  involvement  in  mid-
1980s  than  Germany  but  no  longer 
did so now, and that all had a stron-
ger  banking  system.  These  countries 
had sold publicly owned banks; trans-
formed savings banks in joint stock cor-
porations and divested; turned savings 
banks into cooperatives; reformed the 
governance of public sector banks; and 
abolished the regional principle apply-
ing to public banks so as to maintain 
competition in the face of consolidation. 
The bankings systems resulting from 
these  restructurings  and  others  such 
as  in  Austria  and  Sweden  were  not 
monolithic. Rather, banks were hetero-
geneous in ownership form, specializa-
tion, and size. 
Decressin  and  Hardy  concluded  that 
Germany’s banking system had to adapt 
through reform or it would have to do 
so under stress. They summed up the 
FSAP  view  that  bank  restructuring 
was required, notably to develop new 
sources  of  business/revenues;  that 
there  was  a  need  to  strengthen  the 
resiliency of the system to shocks, else 
the complaints about access to credit 
would be much louder during the next 
economic downswing; that there was 
no  blueprint  for  how  restructuring 
should proceed but that it had to be a 
market-driven process, with freedom to 
explore all possible options within and 
across pillars; and that this process had 
to unfold on a level-playing field, which 
meant  that  legal  privileges  had  to  be 
dismantled.
governance  of  public  sector  banks, 
including greater transparency, which 
would also foster an open debate about 
the future of public sector involvement. 
Decressin and Hardy found it hard to 
identify  a  market  failure  that  justi-
fied a 45 percent asset share of public 
sector  banks  in  Germany.  The  Ger-
man public sector was already divest-
ing  from  many  other  activities:  the 
formerly  public  telecommunications, 
energy, post, and railways companies 
were  all  joint  stock  corporations  by 
now. Similar steps should be considered 
for  Landesbanken  and  savings  banks 
because:  (i)  the  remaining  develop-
ment  banks  (Landesstrukturbanken/
KfW) could take care of projects that 
were in the interest of the public; (ii) 
financial  services  for  disadvantaged 
people could be subsidized rather than 
allocated to public sector banks; (iii) 
public  bank  ownership  entailed  sub-
stantial  fiscal  risks;  and  (iv)  public 
ownership  structures  distorted  com-
petition among banks – public sector 
banks would continue to get a bonus for 
their rating even after the phase out of 
guarantees, as acknowledged by rating 
agencies.
Decressin  and  Hardy  then  compared 
Germany’s  experience  with  public 
sector  banks  with  that  in  other  EU 
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the current strengths of the German 
banking system and would no longer 
foster  systemic  stability,  competition 
and  access  to  ﬁnance.  In  particular, 
the savings banks’ highly efﬁcient way 
of  gathering  information  about  their 
customers and their needs, which give 
rise to the high level of customer sat-
isfaction,  would  suffer  by  weakening 
their position in the banking system. In 
contrast to commercial banks, Schack-
mann-Fallis said, savings banks foster 
a  long-term  ﬁnancial  culture  that  is 
particularly  beneﬁcial  for  small  and 
medium-sized  enterprises,  which  ac-
count for a large part of the German 
business sector. With regard to retail 
banking,  that  has  been  criticized  as 
not  being  competitive  enough  owing 
to  the  continuing  existence  of  state 
guarantees  to  publicly  owned  banks, 
he  stressed  that  a  level-playing  ﬁeld 
is already in place. In particular, the 
observed small margins and low bank 
proﬁts should be seen as a sign of favor-
ably high competitiveness.
The  ﬁrst  panel  of  the  Open  Forum, 
chaired by Krahnen, concentrated on 
industry  responses  to  the  IMF  FSAP 
report and brought together represen-
tatives of each of the three pillars of 
the German banking system. Krahnen 
asked the panelists to give their view 
on the IMF report and comment on the 
reasons why they regarded a change of 
the German banking system as being 
either necessary or unnecessary.
 
As a representative of the savings bank 
sector,  Schackmann-Fallis  spoke 
ﬁrst, and began his statement by thank-
ing  the  IMF  for  directing  attention 
to the German banking system, even 
though much of the attention has been 
given to its perceived weaknesses. He 
made clear, however, that not all of the 
problems mentioned in the IMF report 
are to be blamed on the savings bank 
sector, but are also attributable to the 
commercial banks. Citing Horst Köhler, 
the  current  German  President  and 
former Managing Director of the IMF, 
he stated that “savings banks are good 
for Germany”. In particular, he associ-
ated this statement with the advantages 
of the German banking system, such as 
the system’s resilience under extreme 
stress and the ensuing ﬁnancial stabil-
ity, the increased access to ﬁnance and 
the high level of ﬁnancial services.
With regard to the disadvantages put 
forward,  i.e.,  the  low  and  declining 
proﬁtability  of  the  German  banking 
sector,  Schackmann-Fallis  remarked 
that  high  returns  are  not  an  end  in 
themselves. Rather, the German bank-
ing  system  should  be  very  careful  in 
trying  to  reverse  the  decreasing  de-
velopment of proﬁtability in order not 
to  reduce  its  efﬁciency  in  satisfying 
customers’  needs.  He  criticized  the 
IMF report for promoting the creation 
of  few  large,  stock-listed  and,  to  his 
mind, monotonous banks. He argued 
that  such  a  concept  would  weaken 
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Pleister claimed to be very conﬁdent 
with regard to the sector’s further de-
velopment. In his opinion, the future of 
cooperative banks is based both on the 
proximity  to  its  15  million  members 
and 30 million clients and to a further 
uniﬁcation of the group, for instance 
via the creation of a “credit factory”, 
in order to remain a strong nationwide 
provider  of  high-quality  services  and 
products. 
Weber, representing the commercial 
banks, gave the ﬁnal panel statement and 
started by stating that almost everything 
had already been said on the IMF report 
and its reform suggestions. He said he 
was rather disillusioned since, despite 
all  the  discussions  in  recent  months, 
hardly  anything  had  as  yet  changed. 
In particular, he blamed the defensive 
attitude towards changes on the ideo-
logical stance taken when it comes to 
reforming the German banking system. 
In his opinion, the IMF report clearly 
showed that proﬁtability had to be im-
proved by reducing structural inefﬁcien-
cies in the banking system. The private 
banks were not proposing privatization 
of public banks with the aim of buying 
them and restricting competition. On 
the contrary, a market based banking 
system would increase competition.
However,  he  continued,  the  need 
for  restructuring  should  not  only  be 
seen from a research perspective but 
also  from  a  political  viewpoint.  In 
this  respect,  he  claimed  that  future 
European  consolidation  would  force 
German banks into an active role and 
impose structural changes. In his view, 
the  phase-out  of  state  guarantees  to 
public banks would not be enough to 
Schackmann-Fallis  concluded  his 
speech  by  asking  for  an  explicit  dis-
cussion of the economic rationale and 
political view behind the IMF sugges-
tions for Germany. He said that as long 
as the proposed reform process simply 
imposes the Anglo-Saxon view of eco-
nomics on German banks, the German 
banking  system  would  be  weakened 
rather than strengthened.
The  second  speaker  Pleister  com-
mented on the situation of cooperative 
banks as the second pillar of the Ger-
man banking system. He responded to 
Alan Greenspan’s verdict at the end of 
the 1990s, characterizing the German 
banking  system  as  medieval.  Even 
though some cooperative banks in the 
German countryside may be housed in 
very old buildings, he said, the banking 
system as such is up-to-date and very 
well suited to serve customers’ needs. 
The  cooperative  banking  sector,  in 
particular, tries to achieve the highest 
possible level of customer satisfaction 
via  tailored  banking  services  through 
its wide-spread net of branches, while 
at the same time desiring recognition of 
the group of cooperatives as “one bank”. 
By doing so, the cooperative banking 
sector aims at receiving attention as a 
single entity both for rating, regulatory 
and monitoring means. 
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create a level-playing ﬁeld among the 
different  German  banks.  As  an  ex-
ample he mentioned that the shadow 
rating of Landesbanks, taking into ac-
count the future lack of state guaran-
tees, was remarkably high with an aver-
age of A, compared to the former AAA 
rating. In his view, this still represented 
an implicit guarantee of the state and as 
such unfair treatment of public banks 
compared to commercial banks. As long 
as this situation continued, the German 
banking sector would not make use of 
its real potential but, simply for the sake 
of conserving outdated structures, con-
tinue to squander the positive effects 
that an optimal banking sector would 
have  for  the  German  population  and 
the German economy. With regard to 
the restructuring process, he suggested 
looking  at  other  European  countries 
that  had  already  undergone  major 
changes  in  their  banking  systems.   
He pointed out that in several of these 
reform processes the savings banks sec-
tor had come out in better shape than 
before – an example that should give 
some encouragement to restructuring 
the German banking system in keeping 
with the IMF suggestions.
In the ﬁnal discussion, members of the 
audience  put  forward  the  view  that 
further  European  consolidation  not 
only imposes changes on the banking 
system but on all other ﬁrms as well. 
Their need to do business internation-
ally  gives  rise  to  the  quest  for  truly 
global  German  banks,  providing  ser-
vices not only within Germany but also 
internationally.  Referring  to  one  of 
the statements of Allen’s earlier talk, 
commercial banks were also asked to 
look for opportunities to merge among 
themselves rather than waiting for the 
cooperative  and  savings  bank  sectors 
to  open  up.  In  this  respect,  panel-
ists agreed on the fact that a further 
discussion of the reform process has to 
focus less on ideology and more on the 
position of the banks’ customers and 
their needs.
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Bräuer  started  out  by  stressing  the 
beneﬁts  of  Germany’s  three-pillar 
banking  system.  In  his  view,  such 
system  guarantees  i)  that  banking 
services are offered to everyone any-
where in the country, ii) that there is 
competition to the beneﬁt of customers, 
and iii) that the banking system is sta-
ble. Given these beneﬁts, he argued, 
there is a compulsion to act in the in-
terest of stability when consolidating 
the German banking sector. As an ex-
ample, he referred to the British bank-
ing sector, as being highly consolidated 
and representing an oligopoly of only 
a few large banks. While these banks 
have  a  high  return  on  equity,  both 
supply and prices are bad for custom-
ers.  He  referred  to  a  statement  of 
Ralf  Dahrendorf  that  Britain  needs 
savings  banks.  In  Germany,  prices 
for banking services are low owing to 
high competition stemming from the 
three-pillar  system.  Bräuer  argued 
that  “fragmentation”  is  the  wrong 
word  for  Germany’s  banking  land-
scape, and pointed out that Germany, 
in  addition  to  global  players  also 
needs  regional  players.  Pointing  to 
ways  to  success  in  the  future,  he 
recommended that savings banks and 
his own organization (Helaba) should 
discover  their  own  strength.  With 
respect  to  consolidation,  he  recom-
mended both horizontal and in speciﬁc 
situations vertical integration. A closer 
cooperation  among  savings  banks, 
e.g., in the areas of task and fund al-
location, could lead, quoting Dietrich 
Hoppenstedt (president of DSGV, the 
Association of German Savings Banks), 
to a “decentralized network” of savings 
banks.
The  second  panel  was  chaired  by 
Schmidt and focused on the reorga-
nization  and  consolidation  of  public 
sector banks. In contrast to the ﬁrst 
panel, which consisted of representa-
tives from associations of each of the 
three pillars, the second panel brought 
together  experts  bearing  executive 
responsibilities  within  the  banking 
industry. The composition of the panel 
guaranteed  a  national  as  well  as  an 
international  perspective.  The  panel 
started with brief statements by each 
speaker  on  their  thoughts  about  the 
need and the proposed procedure for 
reorganizing and consolidating public 
sector banks. 
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low end of the range. Third, the share 
of income generated by new services 
for the banks differ between Italy and 
Germany.  In  particular,  the  share  of 
new  sources  of  income,  proxied  by 
non-interest income as a percentage of 
operational  income,  increased  faster 
in Italy than in Germany after starting 
from a similar level.
After  the  cross-country  comparison, 
Moneta turned to the micro-perspec-
tive  and  outlined  the  reasons  behind 
UniCredito  Italiano’s  success.  As 
determinants,  he  identiﬁed  both  the 
own  strategies  of  the  group  and  the 
general  structural  process,  which 
resulted  in  good  performance,  e.g., 
decreasing  cost-income  ratio  as  well 
as  increasing  market  capitalization 
and return on assets. He stressed that 
UniCredito Italiano is a clear example 
of a successful privatization and con-
solidation  process.  Starting  from  the 
privatization  of  Credito  Italiano  and 
the acquisition of several saving banks, 
In the remaining part of his statement, 
Bräuer  discussed  the  pros  and  cons 
of privatizing public banks. While he 
agreed  that  this  would  facilitate  the 
access to private capital, he put forth 
several  reasons  against  privatizing 
savings banks. First, there is resistance 
in  the  population  towards  privatiza-
tion.  Second,  in  contrast  to  private 
banks, public banks are by construc-
tion acting in public interest. Third, 
German  savings  banks  do  not  need 
additional capital, as they already are 
well endowed with this factor. Fourth, 
companies do not exist for the sake of 
stock markets only.
Starting  from  a  more  international 
perspective,  the  second  speaker 
Moneta compared the banking sys-
tems in Italy and Germany in terms 
of  both  micro-  and  macro-environ-
ment. He argued that, given a similar   
macro-environment in both countries, 
differences exist with respect to prof-
itability  and  efﬁciency,  with  Italian 
banks  showing  a  far  better  perfor-
mance  record  than  German  banks 
since the middle of the 1990s. Vari-
ous business ratios (return on assets, 
return  on  equity,  and  cost-income 
ratio) indicate a widening gap. More-
over, the market capitalization of the 
largest three Italian banks grew faster 
than  that  of  their  German  counter-
parts. 
Moneta  identiﬁed  three  structural 
reasons for the superior performance 
of  Italian  banks.  First,  from  1990 
to  1996,  the  ratio  of  public  sector 
ownership  dramatically  decreased  in 
Italy (from 75% to 36%), while it only 
decreased  slightly  in  Germany  (from 
62% to 52%). Second, a comparison 
between banks from various countries 
reveals that there is an inverse relation 
between the return on assets and bank 
density, with Germany having one of 
the highest bank densities and one of 
the lowest return on assets among the 
countries investigated. Similarly, there 
is a positive relationship between the 
average  return  on  assets  of  banks  in 
each country and the market share of 
the ﬁve largest banks in each country. 
Again,  Germany  is  positioned  at  the 
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in only ten years Unicredito Italiano 
undertook a deep process of internal 
reorganization, and it is now a three-
segment  bank  (retail,  corporate  and 
private), has a strong foothold in the 
investment banking business (through 
UBM)  and  in  the  asset  management 
industry (through Pioneer).
Raettig  started  his  comments  by 
stressing that it is not clear whether 
a bank or a market-based economy is 
better. Furthermore, there is no indi-
cation of a credit squeeze in Germany. 
He mentioned three possible reasons 
for the low proﬁts of German banks: 
high  competition,  lack  of  consolida-
tion, and bad management. In his view, 
there is no need or added value to be 
derived  from  having  national  cham-
pions, and banks should rather focus 
on  operating  performance,  provid-
ing new products, services, funding, 
and growth. He referred to both the 
present and the past when he noted that 
there were no homogeneous groups in 
the three pillars. In all pillars, there 
are big regional banks as well as small 
local banks. As an example, he men-
tioned the pillar of cooperative banks, 
with  a  highly  integrated  and  con-
solidated DZ bank coexisting with a 
multitude of local cooperative banks. 
Commenting on the topic of consoli-
dation,  he  stated  that  tendencies  to-
wards de-consolidation can also be ob-
served, e.g., the re-emerged Postbank, 
the  auto-banks,  special  retail  banks, 
and  mortgage  banks.  This  is  to  be 
seen with some skepticism, as no bank 
is  able  to  do  everything  well  every-
where and for everyone. With respect 
to  concentration,  it  is  not  the  three 
pillars  in  Germany’s  banking  system 
that are important, but other dimen-
sions instead. Once again, he stressed 
that banks should concentrate on per-
formance,  and  consolidation  should 
happen with the aim of improving it.
In the subsequent discussion, the audi-
ence linked the statements of Bräuer 
and  Moneta,  by  asking  Bräuer  to 
comment on his hypothesis about the 
three advantages of the German bank-
ing system (general access to banking 
services,  competition,  and  stability) 
in view of the Italian example as out-
lined  by  Moneta.  The  reply  implied 
that  there  is  no  structural  problem. 
The German banking system and the 
services  offered  would  not  improve 
by  changing  the  three-pillar  system. 
Bräuer  referred  to  the  problems  of 
German  private  banks  that  occurred 
when  they  changed  their  strategy  to 
give more weight to investment banking 
rather than to retail banking. Today’s 
problems lie in the main focus on in-
vestment banking in the past of these 
banks with the consequence of a strong 
strategic  disadvantage  in  domestic 
retail- and corporate banking. 
Subsequently,  it  was  asked  whether 
public banks offer their services more 
cheaply than is appropriate when they 
underprice their competitors. Bräuer 
responded by denying that underpric-
ing exists, and stressed that the low 
price level results from competition, 
and  public  banks  generally  offer  the 
same price level as their competitors. 
Raettig added some points to his earlier 
statements on the need of increasing 
bank proﬁtability. He observed that the 
new standards elaborated by the Bank 
of International Settlement (Basel II) 
may  reduce  banks’  proﬁtability;  and 
that in the loan market for small and 
medium-sized enterprises there is no 
evidence of a credit squeeze resulting 
from  the  new  banking  rules.  There 
is enough money available for entities 
that  deserve  funding.  Instead,  there 
is a communication problem between 
banks  and  bank  customers.  Banks 
can  tackle  this  by  asking  the  right 
questions,  demanding  transparency 
(business plans, proﬁts), and by apply-
ing the new banking rules (Basel II). If 
these criteria are met and transparency 
is  achieved,  then  there  is  enough 
money  available.  Raettig  conﬁrmed 
that German banks are not proﬁtable 
enough, but he only partly attributed 
this  to  the  structure  of  the  German 
banking system. The main reasons lie 
elsewhere  and  the  individual  banks 
themselves have to improve in every 
respect  (resource  allocation,  product 
development, and risk management).
Panel on Reorganisation and Consolidation of Public Sector Banks Panel on the Future 
of the German System – 
The Perspective of Policymakers
Moderator
Ajai Chopra
(Senior Advisor, European Department, 
International Monetary Fund)
41 4042 43
notions  banking  system  and  integra-
tion. In his opinion, we can speak about 
a banking system because there is a link 
between all banks, namely the central 
bank.  This  link  is  currency  and  not 
country specific.
He then raised the question as to the 
degree of financial integration in Europe 
and linked this question with a descrip-
tion of two different approaches to inte-
gration, one determined by the single 
currency and the other determined by 
the single market which seeks to pro-
vide a framework for free provision of 
banking services and full capital mobil-
ity in Europe. He remarked that both 
types of integration are still in progress, 
that the level of integration today is sig-
nificantly higher than a few years ago, 
but that further integration is hard to 
measure. He noted that in retail bank-
ing, an area, which is the most visible 
banking  activity  for  customers,  inte-
gration  seems  less  advanced  than  in 
other banking market segments such as 
wholesale and investment banking. In 
line with this he expressed that Euro-
pean banks have too many branches and 
stated his expectation that in the future 
we will see at the top of the system a 
few  big  banks  worldwide  and  some 
banks, which operate only in the Euro-
pean area.
Finally,  Padoa-Schioppa  turned  to  the 
question of remaining barriers to finan-
cial integration. He noted that political 
and regulatory bodies have to create the 
framework for financial integration but 
that it is up to market forces to exploit 
this potential. In this regard he noted that 
some of the potential created for finan-
cial integration by policy makers, namely 
the creation of a single currency, may not 
have been fully exploited yet. In addition 
he acknowledged that there are a number 
of challenges remaining to achieve a truly 
integrated European financial market. By 
way of example, Padoa-Schioppa men-
tioned the mortgage market or financial 
reporting standards. 
Asmussen  commented  on  the  situa-
tion and the future of the banking sys-
tem in Germany. He started his apprais-
al of the IMF report with the remark that 
the report provides a good picture of the 
The third panel was chaired by Chopra 
and  concentrated  on  the  future  of 
public  sector  banks.  The  panel  itself 
combined a mix of policymakers at the 
regional,  national  and  international 
level. Chopra first gave all speakers the 
opportunity to present their thoughts 
on the perspective of the future of the 
German banking system in an opening 
statement.
Padoa-Schioppa,  as  a  representa-
tive of the European Bank, started out 
by  describing  the  background  of  the 
European  perspective.  Key  elements 
of  this  European  perspective  are  the 
level of consolidation and integration, 
the ownership of banks and corporate 
governance  in  the  different  Europe-
an  countries.  Padoa-Schioppa  started 
his talk by taking a closer look at the 
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banking system, so that a structure that 
is stable for a long time may accumulate 
strains. Hence, changes in a banking sys-
tem may be necessary to preserve stabil-
ity and should not be seen as a threat to 
stability. One important determinant of 
the scope for changes in a banking sys-
tem is the regulatory framework, which 
is easier to reform in a healthy economic 
environment and when the banks subject 
to regulation are generally strong. Ingves 
argued that transformation must be pos-
sible within any and across all three sec-
tors of the German three- pillar banking 
system, and ownership of the banks must 
be transparent to all stakeholders. To this 
end, it will be necessary to construct the 
legal framework to allow for the poten-
tial restructuring of the German banking 
system and for experimentation. 
Kotz began his remarks with reference 
to a most remarkable reversal of percep-
tions: Until the early 1990s, German 
(Universal-) banking was conventionally 
rendered as the model to pursue. Pro-
viding for a low user-cost of capital, as 
shown in numerous empirical studies in 
German  banking  system.  The  report 
correctly points out the high level of 
stability of the German banking system. 
This feature has been confirmed by the 
stress tests of the German banking sys-
tem. Moreover he declared himself to
 be very confident about the role of the 
German Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin). BaFin has performed very well 
since its establishment in the year 2002 
and has been widely acknowledged since 
then. Besides many German banks have 
successfully  managed  to  reduce  their 
costs on a permanent basis and lowered 
their credit risk significantly. The three-
pillar structure of the German banking 
system has shown a high degree of flex-
ibility. It has allowed good progress and 
will make further improvements pos-
sible. Mainly for business reasons fur-
ther consolidation could be expected. 
Speaking of the credit institutions under 
public law a clear distinction should be 
made between the so-called Landesbank-
en on the one side and the savings banks 
on the other side. Consolidation across 
the three sectors might gain importance 
on a long-term basis, however not in 
the near future because of the hurdles 
still existing. Apart from this the rating-
based approach under the new pruden-
tial capital adequacy standards will set 
more incentives for risk-adjusted lend-
ing. Appropriate lending is very impor-
tant for the stability of the financial sys-
tem and the economic constitution of the 
banks. Asmussen pointed out the need 
of further developing the legal frame-
work of financial markets und financial 
instruments because the financial system 
and financial products are very innova-
tive requiring a legal system that is up-
to-date. As an example, he referred to 
new investment laws for Hedge Funds 
and covered bonds. 
Ingves commented on the challenges 
facing the banking sector in Germany 
from the perspectives of banking system 
restructuring in other countries. Ingves 
pointed  out  that  key  determinants  of 
the  equilibrium  structure  of  a  bank-
ing system include ownership restric-
tion, market segmentation and the legal 
framework. He saw a trend towards the 
public sector moving out of the bank-
ing system and reducing its impact on a 
new equilibrium. When this happens, it 
is easier to move money into the bank-
ing system and from one part of the sys-
tem to another to adapt to changes in 
demand for bank services, competition, 
and technology. The structure, and its 
flexibility, is intimately linked to its sta-
bility. Ingves mentioned that stability in 
one period does not guarantee stability 
forever because stability is time-depend-
ent; events occur within and outside the 
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ity banking consolidation has usually not 
been driven by purported economies of 
scale (being fairly rapidly exhausted) but 
by the economics of market concentra-
tion or power and, hence, influence on 
price. Moreover, in order to understand 
German banks’ comparative profitabili-
ty performance, in confirming Franklin 
Allen’s previous diagnosis, Kotz point-
ed out that, if one tried to understand 
developments  in  an  aggregate  dimen-
sion, one should quite obviously account 
for differences in activity levels (relative 
to potential output). For almost half a 
decade  the  mediocre  macroeconomic 
performance with its logical corollary, 
a higher number of corporate failures as 
well as the consequential amount of bank 
provisioning,  has,  according  to  Kotz, 
not  been  adequately  acknowledged. 
Hence, as Kotz argues, the frequently 
drawn conclusion, that a reorientation 
towards  a  system  closer  to  the  U.S. 
blueprint  would  be called  for,  would 
need a significantly more solid footing. 
To begin with, it is, as Kotz observed, 
interesting to note that the substantially 
higher degree of interventionist regula-
tion as applied in the U.S. frequently is 
simply not known. Numerous U.S. reg-
ulations, however, from the Truth in 
Lending Act to the Community Rein-
vestment,  try  to  deal  with  perceived 
market imperfections. The same holds 
true for housing finance (Fannie Mae 
and  Freddi  Mac)  or  pension  funding 
(ERISA, the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act or the Pension Ben-
efit Guarantee Corporation). Following 
Kotz, a typical fallacy committed hence 
is to compare the ideal capital-market 
oriented approach with the real model 
of bank-based finance: the prototypi-
cal  grass-is-always-greener  solipsism. 
Given such weak foundations, showing 
up in perceptions cycles, humbleness on 
the part of social engineers would be 
well advised. In finance as well, variety 
could be viable and in the interest of the 
general public, the demand side. Kotz 
therefore finished by reiterating Allen’s 
point that what ain’t broke doesn’t need 
fixing. Or, if deemed to be in need of 
repair, do it most carefully.
Finally, Weimar commented on differ-
ent questions about the role of the State 
of Hesse. First he answered the question 
why the State of Hesse increased its stake 
in the Landesbank. Weimar pointed out 
that Helaba is very important for Hesse, 
and  the  provincial  government  wants 
to have a significant stake in the Helaba 
because it is possible for all provincial 
governments to invest in a Landesbank. 
Second,  he  explained  that  the  long-
term interest of the State of Hesse is the 
affirmation of the three-pillar banking 
particular in the U.S., and allowing for 
a longer horizon it was deemed as most 
appropriate in underwriting a productive 
economy. Barely a decade later, percep-
tions – or as Kotz observed: fashions – 
have completely changed. Meanwhile, 
capital-market  oriented  systems  are 
invariably deemed to be more effective 
in fostering growth, in particular in inno-
vative sectors of the (new) economy. 
The decisive reason for the very much 
declining attractiveness of German-style 
banking was its comparatively lackluster 
performance in terms of profitability. 
And  the  standard  diagnosis  held,  as 
Kotz observed, that this was essentially 
for structural reasons, thereby alluding 
to the German financial system’s in the 
meantime  most  idiosyncratic  feature: 
the  three-pillar  structure  of  private 
banks, cooperative sector credit institu-
tions and public sector – nota bene: not 
state-owned – banks. 
Historically, Kotz remarked, societally 
acknowledged  market  imperfections 
(problems  of  market  access,  credit 
rationing  as  a  result  of  information 
asymmetries  and/or  price  discrimi-
nation) frequently gave rise to public 
sector intervention. While the modes 
of  intervention  –  public  provision  or 
regulation – differed, they, according 
to  Kotz,  essentially  responded  to  the 
same perceived market failures. Thus, 
what matters ultimately is performance 
in two dimensions: efficiency as well as 
stability. As concerns the latter crite-
rion, Kotz observed that, as a system, 
German  finance  had  shown  for  more 
than half a century a remarkable robust-
ness.  He  admitted  that  there  exists  a 
certain  tension  between  competition, 
exposing individual banks to fragility, 
and concentration, redistributing con-
sumers’ surplus to producers. And he 
underlined  that  in  this  dimension  the 
three-pillar system, to be more precise: 
its  provision  of  effective  competition 
(contestedness) is in some way causal 
for lower but, possibly more normal or 
fundamentally  justifiable/sustainable, 
returns on equity. At the same time, as 
the IMF study showed again, German 
banking  has  been  comparatively  cost-
efficient. From a client’s perspective, 
Kotz held, all of this might be rather 
laudable. And, indeed, in mundane real-
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system and the public sector. In addition 
public sector banks are vital for small 
and medium-sized companies and that it 
is essential to have regional banks. The 
savings banks’ and Landesbanks’ finances 
are crucial for SME financing and for 
providing seed capital. Thirdly, Weimar 
confirmed  that  the  state  government 
does  not  appreciate  private  investors 
in  the  saving  banks  and  Landesbanks. 
According  to  the  Hessian  Banks  Act,   
private firms cannot be shareholders in 
saving banks and Landesbanks. 
In  the  final  discussion,  Asmussen 
explained  that  additional  reforms  of 
the banking system should be regarded 
as an effective means of preventing a 
banking crisis as well. Further improve-
ments,  which  closely  match  to  the   
European financial markets, would be 
worth striving for. 